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Infants’  ability  to follow  another  person’s  eye  gaze  has  been  studied  extensively  and  is
considered  to be an  important  and  early  emerging  social  cognitive  skill.  However,  it is not
known whether  young  infants  detect  when  a social  partner  follows  their gaze  to an  object.
This sensitivity  might  help  infants  in  soliciting  information  from  others  and  serve  as  an
important  basis  for social  learning.  In this  study,  we  used  functional  near-infrared  spec-
troscopy  (fNIRS)  to  measure  5-month-old  infants’  frontal  and  temporal  cortex  responses
during  social  interactions  in  which  a social  partner  (virtual  agent)  either  followed  the
infants’  gaze  to an  object  (congruent  condition)  or looked  to  an  object  that  the  infant  had
not  looked  at  before  (incongruent  condition).  The  fNIRS  data  revealed  that  a  region  in  therefrontal cortex
NIRS
left prefrontal  cortex  showed  an  increased  response  when  compared  to  baseline  during  the
congruent condition  but not  during  the  incongruent  condition,  suggesting  that  infants  are
sensitive  to when  someone  follows  their  gaze.  The  ﬁndings  and  their  implications  for  the
development  of early  social  cognition  are  discussed  in  relation  to  what  is  known  about  the
brain  processes  engaged  by adults  during  these  kinds  of  social  interactions.
© 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.. Introduction
Attending and responding to eye gaze is crucial for
uman social interactions. Speciﬁcally, eye gaze plays an
mportant role in directing and coordinating attention
uring triadic interactions between self, other, and the
nvironment. During a typical triadic interaction, a person
ay  establish eye contact with another person and then
irect that person’s gaze to an object or event. The psycho-
ogical process by which two people share attention toward
he same object or event is referred to as joint attention. The
 This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the
reative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use,
istribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original
uthor and source are credited.
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878-9293/$ – see front matter ©  2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. A
ttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.dcn.2013.09.004ability to engage in triadic social interactions is thought to
be critical for a wide range of human activities, supporting
teaching, co-operation, and language learning (Csibra and
Gergely, 2009; Tomasello, 1995; Tomasello et al., 2005).
Moreover, impairments in joint attention are one of the ear-
liest warning signs of neurodevelopmental disorders such
as autism spectrum disorder (Charman, 2003). At the neu-
ral level, it has been shown that joint attention relies on
the recruitment of the medial prefrontal cortex in adults
(Schilbach et al., 2010; Williams et al., 2005), a brain struc-
ture that has been more generally implicated in social
interaction, social cognition and theory of mind (Amodio
and Frith, 2006; Schilbach et al., 2013).
In developmental behavioral work it has been shown
that the ability to engage in joint attention emerges dur-
ing the ﬁrst year of life well before spoken language
(Striano and Reid, 2006; Tomasello et al., 2005). In agree-
ment with ﬁndings implicating medial prefrontal cortex
in joint attention and theory of mind (Schilbach et al.,
ll rights reserved.
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2013), behavioral differences in early joint attention abil-
ities observed during infancy predict later differences in
the more explicit understanding of others’ mental states
assessed during childhood (Charman et al., 2001). Even
though much progress has been made in understand-
ing the behavioral emergence of joint attention during
infancy (Carpenter et al., 1998; Striano and Stahl, 2005),
very little is known about the brain substrate that sup-
ports joint attention in the developing infant. In a recent
study, Grossmann and Johnson (2010) examined brain
responses in 5-month-old infants’ prefrontal cortex during
triadic social interactions using near-infrared spectroscopy
(NIRS) (see Lloyd-Fox et al., 2010, for a description of the
method and its use with infants). In order to investigate
whether young infants engage specialized prefrontal brain
processes when engaged in joint attention, in this study
infants were presented with scenarios in which a social
partner (virtual agent presented on a screen) (a) engaged
in joint attention by gaze cueing the infants attention to
an object after establishing eye contact [joint attention
condition], (b) shifted gaze to an empty location [no ref-
erent condition], or (c) looked at an object without prior
eye contact with the infant [no eye contact condition].
Only in response to the joint attention condition infants
recruited a speciﬁc brain region within the prefrontal cor-
tex, showing 5-month-old infants are sensitive to triadic
interactions. Moreover, like adults, 5-month-olds recruited
a prefrontal region localized in left dorsal prefrontal cor-
tex when engaged in joint attention with another person
(Schilbach et al., 2010), suggesting that young infants’
brains are tuned to share attention with others.
While Grossmann and Johnson’s study (2010) provided
ﬁrst insights into the brain regions implicated in joint
attention in infancy, an important outstanding question
is whether infants are sensitive to when a social part-
ner follows their gaze rather than how infants respond to
joint attention initiated by an adult. This is a particularly
critical question because (a) addressing this question can
inform theories that posit that processes are shared and
ﬂexibly engaged by self and other initiated actions and
interactions (Meltzoff, 2007; Schilbach et al., 2013), and
(b) it may  also speak to accounts postulating differences
between responding to joint attention and the initiation
of joint attention (Mundy and Newell, 2007). Speciﬁcally,
a distinction has been made between: (a) responding to
joint attention, that is, social gaze interactions that con-
sist of infants’ responding to gaze cues of a social partner
(following gaze) and (b) initiating joint attention, that is,
interactions in which the infant initiates the social part-
ner to follow gaze (Mundy and Newell, 2007). Recently,
Schilbach and colleagues (2010) showed that in adults
there are key brain regions, such as the left medial dor-
sal prefrontal cortex, involved in both responding to joint
attention and to initiating joint attention. This suggests
that adults ﬂexibly engage speciﬁc brain processes that are
shared between self and other initiated gaze interactions.
Note that in Schilbach et al.’s study (2010) it was also shown
that adults engage the ventral striatum only when initiat-
ing joint attention, indicating that activation of this brain
region might be speciﬁc to self-initiated gaze interactions;
however, brain activation from structures located as deepive Neuroscience 6 (2013) 155– 161
as the striatum cannot be examined with the neuroimag-
ing method used in the current study (for more information
see Section 4).
We  examined 5-month-olds’ sensitivity to when a
social partner follows their gaze. In addition to measur-
ing brain responses from prefrontal cortex as in prior work
(Grossmann and Johnson, 2010), we also assessed brain
activity in temporal cortex including regions that have been
shown to be involved in biological motion and eye gaze
processing in infants and adults (Grossmann et al., 2008;
Lloyd-Fox et al., 2009; Pelphrey and Morris, 2006). We mea-
sured infant brain responses using fNIRS during scenarios
in which infants’ attention was  ﬁrst cued toward an object
and then a social partner either followed the infants gaze
to that object (congruent condition) or shifted attention to
look at a different object (incongruent condition). Our pre-
diction was  that if young infants are sensitive to when a
social partner follows their gaze then we will see greater
brain activation during the congruent condition than dur-
ing the incongruent condition in brain regions implicated
in joint attention. More speciﬁcally, we  hypothesized that
if infants can ﬂexibly engage the brain processes involved
in joint attention regardless of whether the social gaze-
based joint attention is driven by self or other (Meltzoff,
2007; Schilbach et al., 2013), they will show selective brain
activation (left prefrontal) in the current study that is sim-
ilar to what has been shown in prior work where infants
followed someone’s gaze (Grossmann and Johnson, 2010).
Moreover, we hypothesized that during the incongruent
condition infants will show brain activation in brain regions
that are involved in working memory associated with the
detection of a novel object.
2. Methods
2.1. Participants
The ﬁnal sample consisted of 12 5-month-old infants (5
girls) aged between 137 and 158 days (M = 149.2 days). An
additional ﬁve 5-month-olds were tested but not included
in the ﬁnal sample because they had too many motion
artifacts resulting in too few usable trials for analysis (min-
imum number of 5 trials per condition). Please note that an
attrition rate at this level is within the normal range for an
infant fNIRS study (Lloyd-Fox et al., 2010). All infants were
born full-term (37–42 weeks gestation) and with normal
birth weight (>2500 g). All parents gave informed consent
before the study.
2.2. Stimuli and procedure
Animated photo-realistic face stimuli were gener-
ated using Poser 6.0 (Curious Lab Inc.). This experiment
consisted of two experimental conditions. In both condi-
tions, the infant watched a person’s face in the middle of
the screen. Two objects (cars) were located to either side
of the face. In order to attract infant’s visual attention, after
one second one of the two  objects moved slightly and was
highlighted by a red frame for 500 ms.  This attention get-
ting sequence was  repeated once. Then, in the congruent
condition the person on the screen raised her eyebrows and
T. Grossmann et al. / Developmental Cognit
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aig. 1. This ﬁgure illustrates the channel layout used in this fNIRS study
ith 5-month-old infants.
miled while looking at the infant and then shifted the eyes
oward the object the infant had looked at, and then looked
ack at the infant, and ﬁnally, turned the head toward the
bject. In the incongruent condition, the face did exactly
he same as in the congruent condition, except that in this
ondition the face looked and turned toward the side of the
bject that the infant had not looked at. Eight different clips
ere created, face (female/male), object (left/right), and
xperimental conditions (congruent/incongruent). Infants
at on their parent’s lap while watching the stimuli on a
omputer monitor within an acoustically shielded, dimly
it room. The visual angle of the faces presented subtended
8◦ × 25◦, and each eye subtended 3◦ × 5◦. An experimen-
al trial was 7 s in duration. Trials from the two different
onditions were pseudo-randomly distributed over the
ession with no more than two trials of the same condition
ccurring consecutively. The inter-trial interval was  12 s.
on-social moving visual stimuli were presented during
he inter-trial interval to keep infants’ attention. Infants’
ooking behavior was monitored by camera and then coded
ff-line. Only those data were included in the analysis
ere infants looked at the highlighted (attention-grabbing)
bject (see description above). Furthermore, infants had to
ook at the screen for at least 80% of the duration of the trial
or the data of that trial to be included. Infants watched on
verage 22.3 trials (SD = 4.2).
.3. Data acquisition and analysis
NIRS measurements were made using the UCL topog-
aphy system (Everdell et al., 2005). The multi-channel
ystem uses two wavelengths at 770 nm and 850 nm
sampling frequency 10 Hz). In custom-built arrays and
ead gear, ten optodes in a thirteen-channel (source-
etector pairs) arrangement with an inter-optode separa-
ion of 20 mm were placed over the inferior frontal and
emporal cortices on each hemisphere, and six optodes in
 seven-channel (source-detector pairs) arrangement with
nter-optode separation of 20 mm (channels 41, 42 and 43)
nd 25 mm (channels 39, 40, 44 and 45) were placed over
he prefrontal cortex (see Fig. 1 for channel layout). Fil-
ering and artifact rejection was performed according to
n established procedure (for a detailed description of the
nalysis procedure, see Lloyd-Fox et al., 2009, 2011). Note
hat in the current study we used a different NIRS sys-
em with a different channel layout than in our prior work
n joint attention in infants (see Grossmann and Johnson,
010). Nonetheless, with respect to the comparability
cross studies, channel 44 in the current layout measuredive Neuroscience 6 (2013) 155– 161 157
from a left prefrontal brain region that roughly matches the
brain region speciﬁcally activated during joint attention in
the prior study (Grossmann and Johnson, 2010). Cortical
responses were assessed statistically by comparing aver-
age concentration changes (oxyHb and deoxyHb in mol)
within trials (5–15 s after stimulus onset) during the exper-
imental conditions against baseline (activity during the
inter-trial interval when non-social moving visual stimuli
were presented) using two-tailed one-sample t-tests and
between experimental conditions using two-tailed paired
t-tests.
3. Results
Our analysis of 5-month-old infants’ brain responses
revealed that a region in left prefrontal cortex was  sen-
sitive to when a social partner followed the infant’s gaze.
As shown in Fig. 2, this brain region (channel 44) showed
a signiﬁcant increase in oxyHb when the congruent condi-
tion was compared to baseline (t[1,11] = 4.573, p = 0.0008),
whereas the response to the incongruent condition was
not signiﬁcantly different from baseline (t[1,11] = 1.346,
p = 0.205). The direct comparison between the brain
responses to the congruent condition (M = 0.39; SD = 0.29)
and the incongruent condition (M = 0.21; SD = 0.55) for this
left prefrontal cortex region (channel 44) failed to reach
signiﬁcance (t[1,11] = 1.101, p = 0.294). Moreover, infants
showed a greater decrease in deoxyHb in the congruent
condition (M = −0.29; SD = 0.35) than in the incongruent
condition (M = −0.03; SD = 0.53) in a right prefrontal region
(channel 45; t[1,11] = 2.293, p = 0.042). A greater decrease
in deoxyHb is thought to indicate cortical activation (Obrig
and Villringer, 2003). There was also more widespread
decreases in oxyHb relative to baseline during the congru-
ent condition than during the incongruent condition in a
number of channels in the left and right hemisphere (chan-
nels deactivated during congruent condition 2, 4, 5, 13, 17,
24, 28; channels deactivated during incongruent condition
14, 17, 33; all channels p < 0.05).
Our analysis further revealed that a brain region within
the left inferior frontal cortex was sensitive to when the
social partner looked at an object that the infant had
not previously looked at. As shown in Fig. 3, this brain
region (channel 1) showed a signiﬁcant increase in oxyHb
when the incongruent condition (M = 0.75; SD = 1.13)
was compared to baseline (t[1,11] = 2.447, p = 0.032),
whereas the response to the congruent condition (M = 0.52;
SD = 1.12) was not signiﬁcantly different from baseline
(t[1,11] = 1.627, p = 0.139). Furthermore, there was  a region
within the right posterior temporal cortex (channel 33) that
showed a signiﬁcantly greater decrease in oxyHb relative
to baseline during the incongruent condition (M = −0.67;
SD = 0.44) when compared to the congruent condition
(M = −0.09; SD = 0.78), t[1,11] = 2.671, p = 0.021.
4. DiscussionOur results revealed that a region in the left prefrontal
cortex showed an increased response when compared to
baseline during the congruent condition but not during
the incongruent condition, suggesting that 5-month-old
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ponse fFig. 2. This ﬁgure shows the hemodynamic res
infants are sensitive to when someone follows their gaze.
This sensitivity might help infants in soliciting information
from others and hence may  serve as an important founda-
tion for social learning. From a developmental perspective,
this ﬁnding is in line with theories emphasizing the impor-
tance of the early emergence of social cognitive abilities
required to engage in triadic social interactions (Csibra and
Gergely, 2009; Tomasello et al., 2005) and supports theo-
ries positing a link between processes implicated in actions
performed by self and by others (Meltzoff, 2007). From
a neuroscience perspective, this ﬁnding further strength-
ens accounts that – in contrast to the commonly held
notion of a late maturation of prefrontal cortex functions
– assign a pivotal functional role to the prefrontal cor-
tex in infant cognition in general (Grossmann, 2013a) and
medial prefrontal cortex in infant social cognition in partic-
ular (Grossmann, 2013b). The current ﬁndings thus provide
important insights into the neurodevelopmental basis of
social cognitive functioning.
Our ﬁndings show that the infant prefrontal brain
response during the congruent condition was observed in
the left hemisphere, which is not only in line with the
adult functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) work
(Schilbach et al., 2010) but also corresponds with ﬁnd-
ings showing that greater cortical activation in the leftunction (HRF) during the congruent condition.
prefrontal cortex is positively correlated with children’s
tendency to initiate joint attention (Caplan et al., 1993;
Mundy et al., 2000). With respect to the lateralization of
the prefrontal brain response, it is noteworthy that prior
work with infants and adults has shown that left prefrontal
cortical activation is indicative of a motivation to approach
(Davidson and Fox, 1982; Fox, 1991; Harmon-Jones, 2003).
This raises the possibility that during the congruent condi-
tion infants responded with the motivation to approach the
social partner that followed their gaze, whereas this moti-
vation was absent when the social partner did not follow
gaze. Such an effect on motivational systems may  serve a
vital function in guiding infant social behavior by driving
infants to interact with, learn from and share experiences
with cooperative partners (Tomasello et al., 2012).
The ﬁnding that left prefrontal cortex plays a role in
detecting when a social partner follows gaze is based on
the results obtained when comparing the congruent con-
dition to baseline, while a direct comparison between the
congruent and incongruent condition failed to reach sig-
niﬁcance. This might be explained by the fact that in both
conditions the interaction is triadic in nature (characterized
by eye contact with the infant and a referential look to an
object) and this left prefrontal brain region has been shown
to be sensitive to triadic interactions in previous work with
T. Grossmann et al. / Developmental Cognitive Neuroscience 6 (2013) 155– 161 159
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nfants of the same age (Grossmann and Johnson, 2010),
hus resulting in an activation of this brain region in both
onditions. However, the fact that we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant dif-
erence when looking at the contrast with baseline in the
ongruent condition but not in the incongruent condition
uggests that there is something over and above the triadic
ature of the interaction that engages this region. Clearly,
ore work is needed to further explicate the exact func-
ional role that this region plays during social gaze-based
nteractions in infancy.
Another important issue is how the current ﬁndings
ith infants relate to prior work with adults. In particu-
ar, Schilbach and colleagues (2010) assessed the neural
asis of the distinction between responding to joint atten-
ion and initiating joint attention in adults, and found that
hile there are regions commonly involved in both kinds of
oint attention, such as the left medial dorsal prefontal cor-
ex, the ventral striatum appears to be speciﬁcally engaged
nly when an adult initiates joint attention. This speciﬁc
nvolvement of the ventral striatum has been argued to be
he basis of the rewarding affective experience associated
ith directing someone else’s gaze. Even though the work
ith infants found that there is a shared brain basis for
ther initiated (Grossmann and Johnson, 2010) and self ini-
iated (current study) joint attention as shown in the leftnction (HRF) during the incongruent condition.
prefrontal brain responses, fNIRS as used in the infant work
is not suitable for detecting responses from brain structures
located as deep in the brain as the ventral striatum (Lloyd-
Fox et al., 2010). With respect to the distinction between
responding and initiating joint attention, it will be impor-
tant to improve the current design in two  ways. First, in
line with previous work with older children (Mundy and
Newell, 2007), future studies should include a condition
examining infant brain activation when infants voluntarily
(not externally cued as in the current study) shift gaze to
an object before the social partner looks at the same object
in a purely self-initiated joint attention fashion (Schilbach
et al., 2013). Second, other neurophysiological or behav-
ioral measures indicative of the affective response of the
infant should be included in order to investigate whether
the nature of the social gaze interaction is associated with
differences in positive affect.
We additionally observed a signiﬁcant effect in a right
prefrontal region in which the decrease in deoxyHb was
greater in response to the congruent condition than to
the incongruent condition. A decrease in deoxyHb is taken
as evidence for activation of a brain region (Obrig and
Villringer, 2003), with some methods such as fMRI funda-
mentally relying on a decrease in deoxyHb as a measure
of activation. This suggests that the right prefrontal cortex
l Cognit160 T. Grossmann et al. / Developmenta
might be more involved during the congruent condition
when infants’ gaze was followed. However, in order to
ﬁrmly conclude that a certain brain region is activated one
would expect an increase in oxyHb to be accompanied by
a concomitant decrease in deoxyHb. Because this was  not
the case here, this ﬁnding is difﬁcult to interpret. In general,
there have been only very few fNIRS studies with infants
that report reliable deoxyHb results, and the nature of the
hemodynamic response during infancy and potential dif-
ferences between infants and adults in this regard are still
being debated (see Lloyd-Fox et al., 2010).
In addition to the main ﬁndings, we also observed
widespread deactivation in bilateral inferior frontal and
temporal regions during the congruent condition and in
bilateral temporal regions during the incongruent condi-
tion (as indexed by a decrease in oxyHb when compared
to baseline). It is difﬁcult to interpret deactivation effects
because (a) deactivation depends on what is presented dur-
ing baseline, and (b) it is not entirely clear what a decrease
in oxyHb in a particular region indicates and what func-
tional relevance it may  have (Lloyd-Fox et al., 2010). One
possibility is that the detection of a social partner fol-
lowing one’s own gaze requires increased social cognitive
processing resources in the prefrontal cortex, and this in
turn directly or indirectly suppresses other processes in
more posterior regions of the brain leading to a deactiva-
tion (Schilbach et al., 2008). Such an inverse relationship
between prefrontal and posterior brain regions has been
reported in a variety of learning studies with adults (Gilbert
and Sigman, 2007; Sigman et al., 2005), suggesting that this
might be a more general neurocomputational principle.
However, further work is required to clarify this issue.
Finally, our results also revealed that a region in the left
inferior frontal cortex showed an increased response when
compared to baseline during the incongruent condition
but not during the congruent condition, suggesting that
this region is involved in infants’ detection of the person’s
gaze being directed at an object different or novel from
what they have looked at before. The left inferior frontal
cortex has been shown to be involved in object working
memory processes in adults (Nee et al., 2013), suggesting
that infants’ detection of a novel object through a social
interaction relies on working memory processes in the infe-
rior frontal cortex. In addition, there was a region in the
right posterior temporal cortex that in prior work has been
shown to be sensitive to biological motion and eye gaze
direction (Grossmann et al., 2008; Lloyd-Fox et al., 2009)
that showed an increased deactivation during the incon-
gruent condition than during the congruent condition. As
argued above, such deactivations are hard to interpret.
However, one possibility, as shown in prior work with
adults (Pelphrey et al., 2003), is that incongruent looks of
a social partner at an object evoke brain responses that
are critically different from congruent looks in eye gaze
sensitive cortical regions in the right posterior temporal
cortex, suggesting that not only the movement of the eyes
but also the context in which it occurs is relevant for this
brain region in infant temporal cortex.
Taken together, the current ﬁndings provided critical
insights into the social cognitive capacities that infants
possess with regard to making sense of social interactionsive Neuroscience 6 (2013) 155– 161
during which they have to keep track of a social partners
eye gaze behavior. In particular, we  have shown that a brain
region within the left prefrontal cortex is sensitive to when
a social partner follows the infant’s gaze, whereas a region
with the left inferior frontal cortex is sensitive to when a
social partner acts incongruently to the infant. The ﬁnd-
ing that such young infants can distinguish between these
social interactions and selectively recruit speciﬁc brain
regions suggest that this ability is of pivotal signiﬁcance
for early social cognitive development and learning.
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